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In an English auction, a bidder.s strategy depends on the prices at which his competitors drop out, 
because these convey information on the value of the object on sale. A ring of colluding bidders can 
strategically manipulate the information transmitted through its members.bids, in order to mislead 
other bidders into bidding less aggressively and thus allow a designated ring bidder to bid more 
aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that the ring wins the auction and reduces the price it 
pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency. 
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          1. Introduction
The possibility that bidders collude during an auction is a crucial concern for the seller: there
is considerable evidence that collusion is a widespread phenomenon in auctions, and collusion
typically results in a substantial loss of revenue for the seller.1 We analyze collusion in English
(or ascending) auctions in which bidders￿valuations are not independent and show how a ring
of bidders can exploit the characteristics of the bidding process in order to win more often
and pay a lower price, when other bidders do not know they are facing a ring. Speci￿cally,
ring bidders strategically modify their behavior in order to send misleading signals that a⁄ect
the strategies of their competitors: bidders use their bids as a vehicle of misinformation.
Most of the existing literature on collusion assumes that a ring designates a single bidder
who participates in the auction on behalf of all colluding bidders, while other ring members
have no active task and do not participate in the auction at all.2 So the ring reduces com-
petition in the auction by reducing the number of active bidders. This may reduce the price
paid by the auction winner, but it cannot in￿ uence the probability that a ring bidder wins
the auction.3 When valuations are not independent, however, the ring can do better than
simply eliminating competition among its members ￿ the ring can induce its competitors to
bid less aggressively, thus biasing the outcome of the auction to its advantage.
Consider, as an example, an auction for wildcat oil leases. Part of the value of a tract is
determined by the amount of oil it contains, and this is common to all bidder. But bidders
are usually very uncertain about this value and have access to di⁄erent information, such
as di⁄erent seismic studies on the tract. Knowing the information possessed by competitors
would allow bidders to make a better estimate of the tract￿ s value.
In an English auction, a bidder can infer his competitors￿information on the tract￿ s value
by observing their bids. Therefore, ring bidders may strategically manipulate the information
transmitted through their bids, in order to in￿ uence the bidding strategies of their opponents.
1Many observers argued that the outcome of the European auctions for 3G mobile-phone licenses was af-
fected by collusion and antitrust agencies investigated bidders￿behavior in Italy, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land (Klemperer, 2004). According to Hendricks and Porter (1989), 81% of the 319 Sherman Act Section
1 criminal cases ￿led by the U.S. Department of Justice from November 1979 to May 1988 were in auction
markets. The U.S. Department of Justice￿ s antitrust chief (as quoted by McAfee and McMillan, 1992) reports
that collusive behavior among bidders in auctions for highway contracts increased building costs by at least
10%. Klemperer (2004) argues that preventing collusive behavior is one of the main challenges faced by the
auction designer.
2See, for example, Robinson (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1992), and Mailath and Zemsky (1991). How-
ever, Graham and Marshall (1987) show that, when a ring includes all bidders, bidders can place random bids
in order to conceal the presence of the ring from the seller. Porter and Zona (1993) provide empirical evidence
of this type of strategic behavior. Moreover, Marshall and Marx (2007) show that, in a ￿rst-price auction, a
ring can require bidders to place similar and relatively high bids, in order to prevent deviation by its members.
3In the words of Graham and Marshall (1987): ￿a coalition [...], which contains K of the N bidders at an
auction, gains in expected terms by removing K ￿ 1 bidders from the competitive bidding. If the coalition
does not contain the two bidders with the two highest valuations from the N bidders, then the ring realizes
no gain beyond what each member could have obtained acting non-cooperatively.￿
2If some ring bidders drop out of the auction at a low price, pretending their estimate of the
tract￿ s value is low, non-ring bidders are misled into reducing their own estimate of the
tract￿ s value and into bidding less aggressively. Thus a remaining ring bidder can bid more
aggressively since he su⁄ers a lower ￿winner￿ s curse,￿and the ring shares the enhanced pro￿t.
Our analysis yields the following insights:
￿ In addition to reducing competition among ring bidders, collusion misleads the behavior
of non-ring bidders who are not aware of the presence of the ring. Hence, collusion
reduces the price paid by the ring and increases its probability of winning.
￿ All collusive bidders have an active role in the auction.
￿ Collusion may reduce e¢ ciency (when the auction prize does not have a pure common
value), because the ring may win the auction even if it competes against bidders with
higher valuations.
￿ Collusion makes non-ring bidders strictly worse o⁄ because they are induced to bid less
aggressively, win the auction with a lower probability, and pay a higher price when they
do win.
Hence, we provide an explanation of why players are hurt by collusive agreements among
their competitors and typically try to prevent or denounce such agreements, if they become
aware of them. This contrasts with standard economic analysis (and previous models of
collusion in auctions), that instead suggests that all players in a market, even non-colluding
ones, (weakly) bene￿t from collusion, since competition and prices are lower and all players￿
pro￿t are higher in a market where some players collude.4 Moreover, in the existing literature
collusion a⁄ects neither the behavior of non-ring bidders nor the probability of the ring
winning the auction.
According to the US Department of Justice, a common form of collusion in procurement
auction involves a ￿bid suppression scheme￿in which ￿one or more competitors who otherwise
would be expected to bid, or who have previously bid, agree to refrain from bidding or
withdraw a previously submitted bid.￿ 5 We argue that this strategy may also be aimed at
signalling that the auction prize is relatively unattractive to non-colluding bidders who are
not aware of the ring￿ s presence. Feinstein, Block and Nold (1985) provide evidence that, in
4McAfee and McMillan (1992) even show that, with private valuations, non-colluding players may earn
higher expected pro￿t than colluding ones. A notable exception is Asker (2010) who examines data on bidding
by a ring of stamp dealers that operated in North America in the 1990s and shows that non-ring bidders paid
higher prices because of collusion. The reason was that the side payment that a ring bidder received in the
collusive mechanism was increasing in the valuation he declared, and this determined his bid in the auction.
Hence, collusion induced ring bidders to overbid (see also Graham, Marshall and Richard, 1990). By contrast
to our analysis, however, this behaviour did not increase the ring pro￿t.
5See ￿Price Fixing & Bid Rigging ￿ They Happen: What They Are and What to Look For,￿available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm.
3a series of repeated procurement auctions for highway construction contracts held in North
Carolina between 1975 and 1981, colluding bidders submitted phoney bids to manipulate the
expectation and the choices of the auctioneer, who was unaware of the ring￿ s presence. They
conclude that rings ￿appear to be actively engaged in misinforming purchasers.￿We show
how a ring may also misinform other non-colluding bidders.
After the 3G mobile-phone licenses auctions in the UK and Germany (which raised consid-
erable revenue for the governments), various potential buyers failed to enter other European
auctions.6 This was possibly a consequence of a genuine concern about licenses￿pro￿tabil-
ity or deteriorating bidders￿credit rating. However, by failing to bid ￿rms caused a drastic
reduction in markets￿estimate of the licenses￿value and in the auction prices in many Euro-
pean countries (Klemperer, 2004). Our analysis suggests that failure to bid may have been
an explicit strategic choice, aimed to signalling that the licenses were not valuable.7
Following the literature, we assume that non-ring bidders are unaware of the presence of
a ring in the auction, even after they observe a number of bidders drop out at low prices.
For example, this happens if non-ring bidders remain unaware of the presence of a ring as
long as the probability of the bidding behaviour they observe in the auction being generated
by independent non-colluding bidders is higher than a certain threshold. This assumption is
consistent with the fact that rings usually manage to conceal their presence, in order to avoid
being prosecuted. In Section 6.2, however, we show that, in an almost common-value model,
bidders￿strategies and the auction￿ s outcome are the same both when non-ring bidders know
they are facing a ring, and when non-ring bidders are unaware of the presence of a ring.8
This (somewhat counter-intuitive) result suggests that, in an almost common-value model,
even if non-ring bidders only place some positive probability on the existence of a ring in the
auction, the ring can always credibly signal its presence and obtain the same outcome as it
does under our assumption.
Our insights extend to sequential auctions, even when bidders have private and indepen-
dent values, since bidders infer the level of competition in later auctions by observing their
competitors￿strategies in earlier ones. Therefore, a ring can induce non-colluding bidders to
bid less aggressively in earlier auctions, by having some of its member drop out at low prices,
thus pretending that they have a low valuations for the objects on sale, and hence that they
will not bid aggressively in later auctions. When they do so, non-colluding bidders expect to
be able to win a later auction at a low price.
6There were 13 bidders (for 5 licenses) in the UK auction but, for example, only 6 (for 5 licenses) in Italy
and the Netherlands and 4 (for 4 licenses) in Switzerland (Klemperer, 2004).
7In private conversation, the CEO of a major European telecom company admitted that he tried to ￿talk
down￿the value of the 3G licenses before the auctions.
8When non-ring bidders know they are facing a ring, a common-value English auction has a continuum of
equilibria (Bikhchandani and Riley, 1991). However, by analyzing a pure common-value auction as the limit
of an almost common-value auction, we prove that it is natural to select a unique equilibrium in which bidding
strategies are the same as when non-ring bidders are unaware of the presence of a ring.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a review of the theoretical literature
on collusion in auctions, Section 2 discusses a simple example, based on a pure common-
value model, to introduce the main idea of the paper. In Section 3, following Milgrom and
Weber (1982), we consider an English auction with a¢ liated valuations. Section 4 presents a
collusive mechanism that results in all ring members truthfully reporting their signal. Section
5 analyzes the e⁄ects of collusion on bidding strategies and the pro￿t obtained by colluding
bidders. Section 6 extends the analysis to almost common-value auctions and to sequential
private-value auctions. The last section concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Related Literature There is an extensive theoretical literature on collusion in auctions.9
Robinson (1985) shows that, when all bidders join a ring and select a single bidder to partici-
pate in the auction, collusion is easier to sustain in a second-price auction than in a ￿rst-price
auction, because in a second-price auction the designated winner can bid in￿nitely high and
other bidders have no incentive to cheat. But while Robinson (1985) assumes that ring mem-
bers know their valuations, one of the main problems faced by a ring is how to induce its
members to report their information truthfully. This problem arises because the division of
the ring pro￿t depends on bidders￿valuations; hence, ring members have an incentive to mis-
report them. So the ring has to design a mechanism that e¢ ciently and incentive-compatibly
designates the winner and divides the collusive pro￿t.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) analyze rings that include all bidders in an auction with
independent and private valuations and introduce an e¢ cient and ex-post budget balanced
mechanism. After winning the auction, the ring allocates the object by a ￿rst-price ￿knock-
out,￿with the winner paying each ring bidder (including himself) an equal share of his bid.10
The mechanism is incentive-compatible since a losing bidder￿ s payo⁄ does not depend on
his bid; hence, in the knockout each bidder bids exactly as in a standard ￿rst-price auction
without collusion.11 Notice that the revenue equivalence theorem holds in the main auction,
but each bidder￿ s surplus is higher by a ￿xed amount than in an auction without collusion.
Graham and Marshall (1987) show that, with independent and private valuations, ring
bidders can e¢ ciently allocate the object among themselves in dominant strategies by running
a second-price knockout before the main auction, the winner of which pays (the second-highest
bid to) a risk-neutral ￿ring center￿who previously paid all ring bidders an equal share of the
9For a review of the empirical literature on collusion see Porter (2005).
10See also Graham, Marshall and Richard (1990) and Deltas (2002) for descriptions and analysis of knock-
outs.
11This is a special case of the mechanism proposed by Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) to assign an
object jointly owned by a group of agents. When bidders cannot make side-payments, however, McAfee and
McMillan (1992) prove that the ring cannot extract any information from its members and can do no better
than randomize the right to bid in the main auction. For an analysis of collusion in repeated auctions when
bidders cannot make side payments see Aoyagi (2003), Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004), Skrzypacz and
Hopenhayn (2004), and the references therein.
5expected payment by the winner (so that payment received by ring bidders do not depend on
their bids). This mechanism, however, is only budget balanced in expectation. The authors
also extend the result to rings that do not include all bidders in second-price and English
auctions. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) analyzes the case of heterogenous bidders, and show
that e¢ cient collusion can be achieved without the need for a ring center.
Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2008) extend the ex-post budget balanced mechanism of
McAfee and McMillan (1992) to auctions with a¢ liated values in which all bidders collude.
By contrast, we consider rings that do not include all bidders in auctions with a¢ liated values
and extends the ex-ante budget balanced mechanism of Graham and Marshall (1987) that
allows colluding bidders to equally share the expected collusive pro￿ts.
In general, however, ring bidders may want to cheat at the main auction. Marshall
and Marx (2007) show that, when the ring cannot directly control its members￿bids and
the collusive mechanism cannot rely on the auction outcome, collusion is more di¢ cult at
￿rst-price than at second-price auctions. This con￿rms the results of Robinson (1985).12
Moreover, Marshall and Marx (2009) show that various details of the design of second-price
and ascending auctions are crucial for reducing the pro￿tability of collusion.
Bidders do not necessarily want to join a ring. When bidding is costly, Tan and Yilankaya
(2007) show that high-value bidders may signal their valuation by refusing to participate in
a ring, thus inducing their competitors not to bid in the main auction. In common-value
auctions, Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2008) show that bidders￿who have good information
on the value of the prize may prefer to bid non-cooperatively, even when there is no bidding
cost.
The use of bids as a signalling device has already been underlined by Bikhchandani (1988)
and Brusco and Lopomo (2002). Bikhchandani (1988) shows that, in sequential common-
value auctions without collusion, a bidder can establish a reputation for bidding aggressively,
thus inducing his competitors to bid less aggressively in future auctions. Brusco and Lopomo
(2002) analyze (tacit) collusion in multi-unit ascending auctions and prove that a bidder can
use his bid to truthfully signal his valuations to his competitors, in order to agree on a division
of the objects and end the auction at low prices.13 By contrast, we prove how bidders can
use their bids to communicate misleading information regarding their valuations.
12Moreover, Lopomo, Marshall and Marx (2005) show that, in an English auction, collusion generates
ine¢ ciency if ring members cannot communicate information regarding their values before the auction and
the collusive mechanism has to be ex-post budget balanced.
13Cramton and Schwartz (2000) argue that this type of signalling strategy was adopted during the FCC
spectrum auctions in the 1990s. Weber (1997), Ausubel and Cramton (1998), Englebrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1998), Grimm et al. (2003), and Pagnozzi (2010) also analyze collusion in multi-unit ascending auctions.
62. An Example: Common Value
Consider an English auction for a prize whose value is exactly the same for all bidders.14
There are three bidders ￿ called 1, 2 and 3 ￿ and each bidder i receives a non-negative
private signal xi about the value of the prize. Signals are independently and uniformly
distributed. Similarly to the ￿wallet game￿of Klemperer (1998) and Bulow and Klemperer
(2002), the common value of the auction prize is:
V (x1;x2;x3) = x1 + x2 + x3 ￿ c;
where c is a strictly positive small number that represents a ￿xed cost that the winner has
to pay in order to use the prize. A strategy for a bidder speci￿es the price at which he drops
out if no other bidder has dropped out yet, and the price at which he drops out after one
other bidder dropped out.
In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the auction, if no bidder has dropped out of the
auction yet, bidder i bids up to:15
maxfV (xi;xi;xi); 0g = maxf3xi ￿ c; 0g: (2.1)
That is, a bidder bids up to the price at which he makes no money if he wins the auction
when all other bidders have his same signal (and, therefore, he is indi⁄erent between winning
or losing), provided this value is not negative.16 A bidder with a signal lower than x ￿ c
3
drops out of the auction at price zero, because he can never win and obtain a positive pro￿t.
Dropping out at price zero can be interpreted as failing to bid more than the reserve price, or
not participating in the auction at all, or exiting immediately, as soon as the auction starts.17
When a bidder quits the auction, he reveals information about his signal to the remaining
bidder(s), who update their bidding strategies accordingly. If two or more bidders drop out
at price zero, the auction ends immediately. If one bidder drops out at price zero, he reveals
that his signal is at most x; hence on average it is equal to c
6. Then in the unique symmetric
14In an English auction the price starts at zero and is raised continuously by the auctioneer until only one
active bidder is left. A bidder who wishes to be active at the current price depresses a button and, when he
releases it, he is withdrawn from the auction. The price level and the number of active bidders are continuously
displayed.
15Notice that this strategy, as well as the one in (2.3), is independent of the signals￿distributions and does
not require the distributions to be symmetric.
16To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose bidder i deviates when other bidders bid according to (2.1),
stays longer in the auction and wins at price 3xi￿c+", when both the other bidders drop out. Then, however,
each of the other 2 bidders has signal
1







Hence, bidder i pays more than the prize is worth. By contrast, at price 3xi ￿ c ￿ " bidder i knows that, if
both the other bidders drop out, he wins and pays less than the value of the prize. Hence, he has no incentive
to drop out. It is straightforward to show that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
17Only in English auctions, and not in sealed-bid auctions, do players observe their opponents bidding, and
hence know whether or not they are participating in the auction.
7equilibrium a remaining bidder bids up to:
E[V (xi;xi;xj)jxj ￿ x] = 2xi + E[xj jxj ￿ x] ￿ c (2.2)
= 2xi ￿ 5
6c
If no bidder drops out at zero and, say, bidder j drops out at a positive price, he reveals his
signal xj. Then in the unique symmetric equilibrium a remaining bidder bids up to:
V (xi;xi;xj) = 2xi + xj ￿ c: (2.3)
Basically, the auction proceeds in two phases. In the ￿rst one, the bidder with the lowest
signal drops out and reveals (some or all of) his private information. If no more than one
bidder drops out at price zero, in the second phase the two remaining bidders engage in
a second-price auction using the information acquired in the ￿rst phase. In each phase, a
bidder bids up to his estimate of the prize value, conditional on all the information he has
and on winning against opponent(s) with his same signal, provided this estimate is positive.
To update his estimate of the prize value, a bidder infers his competitors￿private information
from their bidding behavior.18
Suppose now that two bidders, say 1 and 2, join a ring and that the third one does not
know they do, nor does she suspect it.19 (We are going to relax this assumption in Section
6.2.) To make the analysis interesting, suppose that both bidders￿signals are higher that
x. (If at least one ring bidder has a signal lower that x, then collusion has no e⁄ect on the
auction outcome.) Since the bidding strategy of bidder 3 may depend on the price at which
a ring bidder drops out, the ring can induce bidder 3 to bid less aggressively.
Assume, without loss of generality, that x1 > x2 and assume that ring members know
each other￿ s signals.20 The bidder with the highest signal (i.e., bidder 1) is the designated
bidder while the bidder with the lowest signal (i.e., bidder 2) drops out of the auction at price
zero. This misleads bidder 3 into thinking that bidder 2 has a signal weakly lower than x. If
bidder 3￿ s signal is lower than x, collusion does not a⁄ect her strategy anyway. But if bidder
3￿ s signal is higher than x, she reduces her own estimate of the prize value and, by equation
(2.2), she only bids up to 2x3 ￿ 5
6c.
As a result, bidder 1 su⁄ers a lower winner￿ s curse and can bid more aggressively. Indeed,
if bidder 1 wins the auction at price p, he knows the value of the prize is:







18For example, suppose that only one bidder drops out at price zero and bidder j uses the bidding strategy











This is lower than p if and only if p is lower than (2.2).
19We adopt the convention of using feminine pronouns for the non-ring bidders.
20In Section 4 we are going to prove that the ring can design a mechanism such that it is incentive compatible
for each colluding bidder to truthfully reveal his signal.
8Bidder 1 stays in the auction as long as the price is lower than the prize value ￿ i.e., he bids
up to p￿ such that:






, p￿ = 2(x1 + x2) + 5
6c:
So the ring wins the auction if and only if:
x1 + x2 + 5
6c > x3:
By contrast, without collusion bidder 3 bids up to 2x3 + x2 ￿ c (assuming that x3 > x) and
bidder 1 wins the auction if and only if x1 > x3.
The ring achieves two objectives: (i) it reduces competition in the auction by eliminating
one ￿serious￿bidder; and (ii) it reduces the aggressiveness of the non-ring bidder. Therefore,
collusion increases the probability that the designated bidder wins the auction, because the
designated bidder may win even if bidder 3 has the highest signal. Moreover, the designated
bidder pays a lower price when he actually wins.21
The extra pro￿t obtained by the ring is given by the di⁄erence between the price the
designated bidder would have paid without collusion and the price he actually pays, when he
has the highest signal ￿ i.e., x2 ￿ 1
6c ￿ and by the di⁄erence between the prize value and
the price the designed bidder pays, when he does not have the highest signal and wins the
auction ￿ i.e., x1 + x2 ￿ x3 ￿ 1
6c.
3. The Model
Consider an English auction with n risk-neutral bidders. Each bidder i receives a (private)
signal xi ￿ 0 of the value of the object on sale, which is the realization of a random variable
Xi. The random elements of the vector X ￿ (X1;:::;Xn) have joint probability density
function f (x). We assume that f (:) is symmetric in all its arguments and, therefore, that
bidders￿signals are identically distributed. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982), we assume
that the variables X1;:::;Xn are a¢ liated. Roughly, random variables are said to be a¢ liated
when higher values for some of the variables make the other variables more likely to be high
than low.






where u : Rn ! R0
+ and fXjgj6=i represents the unordered set of signals di⁄erent from
Xi. Hence, each bidder￿ s valuation is a symmetric function of the other bidders￿signals.
21For example, if signals are uniformly distributed on [0;1] and k = 0, the ring wins the auction with
probability
5
6 while, without collusion, each bidder wins with probability
1
3. Before the auction, the expected
price the designated bidder pays conditional on winning is equal to
9
10, while without collusion the expected
price he pays conditional on winning is equal to
5
4.
9We assume that u is continuous and (weakly) increasing in each of its arguments, which
implies that bidders￿valuations are a¢ liated too (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 3).22




@Xj for every X and j 6= i. This single crossing
condition ensures that, if bidder i￿ s signal is higher than bidder j￿ s one, then bidder i values
the prize more than bidder j.23
Let Y1;:::;Yn￿1 denote respectively the smallest,..., largest signal from among fXjgj6=i.
Bidder i￿ s valuation can be written as Vi = u(Xi;Yn￿1;:::;Y1). The variables Xi;Y1; :::;Yn￿1
are also a¢ liated (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 2). We assume that
E[Vi j Xi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Y1 = 0] = V < 0
￿ i.e., a bidder￿ s expected valuation is negative if all bidders￿signals are equal to zero ￿
and let x be such that E[Vi j Xi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Y1 = x] = 0.
In an English auction, a strategy for a bidder speci￿es whether, at any price level, he
remains active or drops out. So if k bidders dropped out at prices p1 ￿ ::: ￿ pk, bidder i￿ s
strategy can be described by a function ￿i
k (xi;p1;:::;pk) which specify the price at which he
drops out. If the current price is higher than the price at which a bidder would like to drop
out, then he drops out immediately.







, i = 1;:::;n, de￿ned iteratively by:
￿i
0 (xi) = maxfE[Vi jXi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Y1 = xi]; 0g; (3.1)
￿i






Xi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Yk+1 = xi;
￿i
k￿1 (Yk;p1;:::;pk￿1) = pk;:::;￿i
0 (Y1) = p1
￿
; (3.2)
k = 1;:::;n ￿ 2, are equilibrium bidding strategies.
Notice that, when l ￿ k bidders dropped out at price zero, the bidding strategy (3.2) is
equivalent to:
￿i






Xi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Yk+1 = xi;
Yk = yk;:::;Yl+1 = yl+1;Yl ￿ x;:::;Y1 ￿ x
￿
;
where yl+1;:::;yk are the realizations of the random variables Yl+1;:::;Yk. Therefore, in
equilibrium each bidder bids up to the price at which he is just indi⁄erent between winning
and losing, if all remaining bidders have his same signal, given the information revealed by
bidders who dropped out of the auction. If this price is negative, then the bidder drops out
at price 0, which can be interpreted as dropping out at the reserve price.
22In the pure common-value example of Section 2, signals are independent (and hence a¢ liated), and the
prize value is ￿symmetrically￿increasing in each signal.
23This assumption is not necessary for our results, but it simpli￿es the analysis since it ensures that the
bidder with the highest signal is also the one with the highest valuation.
10To update their estimate of the object￿ s value, bidders use the quitting prices of their
competitors to infer their information. Intuitively, the bidding strategy ￿i
k;l (xi;yl+1;:::;yk)
is (strictly) increasing in xi, is (strictly) increasing in the competitors￿signals, and is (strictly)
decreasing in l (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 5). This is the feature that can be ex-
ploited by a ring to mislead outsiders and modify the outcome of the auction to its advantage.
We assume m randomly chosen bidders join a ring, 2 ￿ m < n, and at least two of
them have signals higher than x.24 Let W1;:::;Wm be respectively the lowest, ..., highest
signal received by ring members, and let Z1;:::;Zn￿m be respectively the lowest, ..., highest
signal received by non-ring bidders. We denote the realizations of Wi and Zi by wi and zi
respectively.
Following the literature, we assume that non-ring bidders do not know that they are
facing a ring (see, e.g., Assumption 3 in Graham and Marshall, 1987). We believe this is
a reasonable assumption, since rings usually attempt and manage to conceal their existence
from competitors and auctioneers, in order to avoid being denounced and prosecuted by
antitrust authorities.25 We also assume that non-ring bidders remain unaware of the ring￿ s
presence after they observe a number of bidders drop out of the auction at low prices. This
can be interpreted as non-ring bidders adopting the following strategy. After observing l
bidders drop out at prices lower than p, a non-ring bidder follows the strategy described in
Proposition 1 if the probability of l non-colluding bidders having signals that induce them
to drop out at prices lower than p is higher than a threshold ￿. Otherwise the non-ring
bidder disregards all information embodied in her competitors￿strategies (and hence cannot
be fooled into believing that a ring bidder has a low signal). We assume that ￿ is small enough
so that it is optimal for the ring to have all but one bidder drop out at the lowest possible
price, since this does not reveal the ring￿ s presence. In Section 6.2, we relax this assumption
in a simple model of an almost common value auction, and consider non-ring bidders who
know they are facing a ring.
4. Collusive Mechanism
There is a risk-neutral ring center who acts as mediator and banker for the ring, and designs a
mechanism to regulate ring bidders￿behavior. We will construct a mechanism that results in
all ring bidders revealing their true signals and that allows the ring to increase its probability
of winning the auction and its expected pro￿t.
Consider a mechanism that requires each ring bidder to report his private information.
24We do not analyze bidders￿choice to participate in a ring. We assume that it is not possible for all bidders
to join the ring because, for example, legal considerations force the ring to limit membership in order to avoid
detection. Moreover, in contrast to standard models of collusion, colluding bidders have no incentive to allow
outsiders to join the ring, when outsiders are not aware of the presence of the ring, as we assume.
25For example, it took over 15 years for a non-ring dealer to denounce a ring of stamp dealers operating in
North America, even if non-ring dealers were strongly damaged by collusion (Asker, 2010).
11Given the reports, the mechanism must determine: (i) the strategy of each bidder in the
auction, (ii) the designated bidder who receives the prize if it is won by the ring, and (iii)
the payments each ring bidder makes/receives. The mechanism is incentive-compatible if it
is an equilibrium for each ring bidder to report his private information truthfully and to
follow the bidding strategy set by the ring. The mechanism is (ex-ante) budget-balanced if
side-payments sum to zero in expectation.
The following mechanism M ￿ a pre-auction knockout ￿ generalizes the one proposed by
Graham and Marshall (1987) that considered the special case of independent private values.




C (Wm = Wm￿1)];
that is, an equal share of the expected collusive pro￿t of the ring bidder with the highest
signal, if he has a signal equal to the expected second-highest signal among ring bidders.
(This expected pro￿t is described in Section 5.)
2. Each ring bidder reports his signal to the ring center. Let w1;:::;wm be respectively
the lowest, ..., highest reported signal.
3. The ring member who reported the highest signal (and, hence, the highest valuation)
is the designated bidder. He pays the ring center E[￿m
C (Wm = wm￿1)] (his expected
collusive pro￿t if he had a signal equal to the second-highest reported signal) and retains
the prize if he wins the auction. The other m ￿ 1 ring bidders drop out of the auction
at price zero.





is the price at which he drops out given that k non-ring bidders have dropped out. This









k = 0;:::;n ￿ m ￿ 1, where:
 k (xi) = ￿i
k;m￿1 (xi;z1;:::;zk); k = 0;:::;n ￿ m ￿ 1:
Proposition 2. Mechanism M is incentive-compatible and (ex-ante) budget-balanced.
26In the proof of Lemma 1, we show that, when the ring adopts mechanism M, a non-ring bidder bids up
to  k after k non-ring bidders have dropped out of the auction, and that ￿ is an equilibrium bidding strategy
for the designated bidder. Notice that strategy ￿ calls on the designated bidder to remain active up to the
price at which he would be just indi⁄erent between winning and losing the auction ￿ i.e., up to his expected
valuation conditional on winning, given the signals of all ring members and the information he can infer from
the prices at which non-ring bidders drop out.
12In mechanism M, before the auction each ring bidder receives from the ring center an
equal share of the expected payment by the designated bidder to the ring center. In addition,
the designated bidder retains the auction prize if he wins it and any additional pro￿t (or
losses) he obtains during the auction. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the mechanism
is incentive compatible because the side payments made to and received from the ring center
do not depend on the signal reported and, if other ring bidders report their signals truthfully,
a bidder obtains positive expected pro￿t by being chosen as the designated bidder if and only
if he has the highest signal among ring bidders.
5. E⁄ects of Collusion
Since the ring can design a mechanism to make each bidder truthfully report his signal, it
can be assumed that the ring knows its members￿signals. In this section, we analyze bidding
strategies when the ring adopts mechanism M and show that collusion allows the designated
bidder to win more often and pay a lower price. We say that a bidder bids more (less)
aggressively in auction A than in auction B if the price at which he drops out is higher
(lower) in auction A than in auction B.
Lemma 1. When the ring adopts mechanism M, non-ring bidders bid less aggressively and
the designated bidder bids more aggressively than in an auction without collusion.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When non-ring bidders who are unaware
of collusion observe potential buyers dropping out at price zero, they infer that their signal is
at most equal to x. This induces them to reduce their estimate of the prize value and bid less
aggressively. Given that non-ring bidders bid less aggressively, the designated bidder su⁄ers
a lower winner￿ s curse if he wins the auction; hence, he can bid more aggressively.
Lemma 2. Compared to an auction without collusion, when the ring adopts mechanism M:
(i) the probability that the designated bidder wins the auction is higher, and (ii) conditional
on winning the auction, the designated bidder pays a lower price.
Without collusion, the designated bidder wins the auction if and only if he has the highest
valuation. By contrast, the designated bidder can win even against a bidder who has a higher
signal, and hence a higher valuation. Therefore, collusion may lead to an ine¢ cient allocation
of the auction prize.












where 1f:g is the indicator function. From Lemma 2, it follows that the ring increases its
expected pro￿t both by increasing the probability of winning the auction and by reducing
the price paid.
13Proposition 3. By adopting mechanism M, the ring increases its expected pro￿t (compared
to an auction without collusion).
The extra pro￿t obtained by collusion depends on two di⁄erent e⁄ects:
1. The reduced competition e⁄ect due to the fact that m￿1 ring bidders do not bid positive
prices.
2. The signalling e⁄ect due to the strategic behavior of ring bidders who drop out at price
zero, making non-ring bidders bid less aggressively and the designated bidder bid more
aggressively.27
The signalling e⁄ect only arises in an English auction with a¢ liated valuations. In fact,
in other auction mechanisms bidders cannot observe their competitors￿bid and hence infer
their information. Moreover, when bidders￿valuations are independent, bidders￿strategies
are not a⁄ected by their competitors￿information. In both cases, bids lose their signalling
content.28
The reduced competition e⁄ect does not a⁄ect the probability that the designated bidder
wins the auction, it only increases his payo⁄, given that he wins. The previous literature on
collusion in auctions concentrated on this ￿rst e⁄ect and neglected the potential advantage
for ring bidders of strategically manipulating their bids. Moreover, by contrast to standard
analysis that suggest that all players bene￿t from (or at least are not hurt by) collusion
(because collusion reduces competition), in our model non-ring bidders who are unaware of
the ring￿ s presence are made worse o⁄ by collusion, because they are induced to bid less
aggressively and this reduces their probability of winning the auction.
The actual (ex-post) extra pro￿t of the ring is the given by the extra pro￿t the designated
bidder obtains by collusion, which depends on bidders￿signals. When the designated bidder
has the highest signal among all potential buyers, the ring gains by reducing the price paid
for the object; when the designated bidder does not have the highest signal, the ring gains
by giving him a chance to win the auction anyway.
6. Extensions
6.1. Seller￿ s Strategy
Collusion reduces the e¢ ciency when the prize is won by the designated ring bidder but
he does not have the highest valuation. Moreover, with independent signals, collusion also
























28However, in Section 6.3 we show that with sequential auctions bids have a signalling content that can be
exploited by colluding bidders even if valuations are independent.
14reduces the expected auction price and the expected seller￿ s revenue. To see this, notice that,
with independent signals (and downward sloping marginal revenues),29 an English auction
with an appropriate reserve price maximizes the seller￿ s revenue if bidders bid independently,
because it sells to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue (Myerson, 1981; Bulow
and Klemperer, 1996). But collusion among bidders modi￿es the allocation achieved by the
auction since the prize need not be assigned to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue,
and this reduces the expected seller￿ s revenue.30
So a seller who wants to achieve an e¢ cient allocation and maximize revenue should try to
prevent bidders from joining a ring and, if he cannot do so, he should try to prevent colluding
bidders from signalling to their opponents. For example, the seller could choose an auction
mechanism in which bids are unobservable, like a second-price sealed-bid auction.
6.2. Non-Secret Rings with Almost Common Values
In this Section, we consider a simple model that allows us to analyze the e⁄ects of relaxing
the assumption that non-ring bidders do not know they are facing a ring. In the pure
common-value example of Section 2, if bidder 3 knows that bidders 1 and 2 collude, then she
knows that she bids against a ring who shared its members￿information on the value of the
object and bids accordingly. So this is like an auction with two bidders who have signals x3
and x1 + x2 respectively. The problem is that, in a pure common-value auction, there is a
continuum of equilibria and, typically, a single equilibrium is only pinned down by assuming
symmetry among bidders (Bikhchandani and Riley, 1991). But when a bidder knows she is
facing a ring, there is an intrinsic asymmetry between the ring￿ s information and bidder 3￿ s
information on the value of the object.31 For instance, when c = 0, bidder 3 bidding up to
tx3 and a ring bidder bidding up to t
t￿1 (x1 + x2) is an equilibrium of the auction, for every
t > 1. However, there is a natural way to select a unique equilibrium by slightly perturbing
this example.
Consider an almost common-value auctions with three bidders, in which bidders 1 and
2 join a ring and learn each other￿ s signals. As in Bulow and Klemperer (2002), bidders￿
valuations are: ￿
V1 = V2 = (1 + ")(x1 + x2) + x3;
V3 = (1 + ")x3 + x1 + x2;
where " ￿ 0. This represents a situation where a bidder places a slightly higher weight to a
signal he knows before the auction starts.





30For example, if signals are uniformly distributed on [0;1] and c = 0, the expected seller￿ s revenue of the
pure common-value auction of Section 2 is equal to
5




31Levin (2004) analyzes joint bidding in a second-price auction by symmetric groups of bidders (i.e., groups
composed by the same number of bidders).
15An interpretation of these value functions is that information known before the auction
starts is more valuable than information obtained during or after the auction (like a com-
petitor￿ s signal), because bidders are better able to exploit information they obtain earlier,
and act upon it in order to earn higher pro￿t. Another interpretation is that bidders actively
collect information before starting the auction. In this case, when bidders choose what par-
ticular type of information to collect after joining a ring, they can focus on information that
is better suited to their own speci￿c use of the auction prize, and hence is more valuable than
their competitor￿ s information. For example, before an auction for a mobile-phone license,
telecom ￿rms usually conduct surveys of costumers in order to forecast future demand, and
each ￿rm￿ s survey is also valuable for its competitors. But ￿rms with di⁄erent business plans
conduct di⁄erent surveys and attach di⁄erent weights to their competitors￿surveys: a ￿rm
that plans to focus on business customers will conduct a survey of those customers and will
attach a lower weight to a survey made by another ￿rm focused on residential customers.
Assume ￿rst that bidder 3 does not know that she is facing a ring. It is straightforward
that, in equilibrium, bidder 3 starts bidding up to (3 + ")x3 and, after a bidder drops out
at price p, she bids up to (2 + ")x3 +
p
3+" (because she expects the bidder who dropped out
to have signal
p
3+"). Therefore, if the ring adopts mechanism M and a ring bidder drops out
at price zero, then bidder 3 bids up to (2 + ")x3 while the remaining ring bidder bids up to
(2 + ")(x1 + x2).32 For " ! 0, these bidding strategies converge to the equilibrium bidding
strategies of the pure common-value example of Section 2.33
Suppose now that bidder 3 knows that her opponents joined a ring.
Lemma 3. When bidder 3 knows she is facing a ring, in the unique linear equilibrium of the
almost common-value auction bidder 3 bids up to (2 + ")x3 and one ring bidder bids up to
(2 + ")(x1 + x2) (while the other ring bidder does not participate in the auction).
Notice that the equilibrium involves exactly the same bidding strategies as in the case
in which bidder 3 does not know she is facing a ring. For " ! 0, the almost common-value
model selects a ￿natural￿equilibrium for the pure common-value case.34
The intuition for this result is the following. If bidder 3 does not know that she is facing
a ring, then after a bidder drops out at a low price she believes that bidder has a low signal,
32To see that this is an equilibrium, notice that if bidder 3 bids up to (2 + ")x3, then when a ring bidder
wins the auction at price p he knows the prize is worth (1 + ")(x1 + x2)+
p
(2+"); hence he is willing to stay in
the auction up to price p
￿ such that p
￿ = (1 + ")(x1 + x2) +
p￿
(2+").
33From the seller￿ s point of view, even if allowing bidders to join a ring in this almost common-value setting
slightly increases their valuation, it can still reduce revenue because it induces a non-ring bidder to bid less
aggressively. Moreover, for " ￿ 0 the auction is always (almost) e¢ cient, regardless of which bidder wins it.
34In this equilibrium, bidder 3 bids relatively cautiously and the ring bidder can bid quite aggressively. An
interpretation is that, when the presence of a ring is common knowledge, bidder 3 knows she is competing
against a bidder who is ￿advantaged￿ (since, on average, his valuation is " ￿ E[x] higher than bidder 3￿ s
valuation) and, hence, has to bid cautiously to avoid the winner￿ s curse.
16which is bad news about the prize value. However, bidder 3 also believes that the other
remaining active bidder is choosing to stay in the auction notwithstanding the fact that he
also knows that the bidder who dropped out has a low signal. This means that the remaining
active bidder has a high signal, and this is good news for bidder 3 about the prize value. On
the other hand, if bidder 3 knows she is facing a ring, she makes none of the two inferences.35
In our simple model, the bad and good news exactly cancel out, so that the outcome of the
auction is the same whether bidder 3 believes there is a ring with probability 0 (but a ring is
active) or with probability 1. Basically, when bidder 3 does not know she is facing a ring, the
ring pro￿ts from misleading her strategy; while when bidder 3 knows she is facing a ring, the
ring pro￿ts from bidder 3 knowing that her opponents shared information about the prize
value.
Therefore, in this almost common-value auction, the ring can do just as well when bidder 3
knows she is facing a ring as when bidder 3 does not suspect that her opponents are colluding.
Even if bidder 3 places some positive, but di⁄erent from 1, probability on the existence of a
ring in the auction, bidder 1 and 2 can credibly signal that they are colluding and obtain
the same outcome as under our assumption.
6.3. Sequential Private-Value Auctions
In sequential private-value auctions, a ring of bidders can adopt a strategy similar to the one
we have described for a single auction with a¢ liated values. Consider, as a simple example,
a sequence of two English auctions for two identical prizes with three bidders. Each bidder i
demands exactly one prize and has a privately known valuation vi for each prize, i = 1;2;3.
Suppose there is no collusion. In the second auction, it is a dominant strategy for the two
bidders who did not win the ￿rst auction to bid up to their valuation. In the ￿rst auction,
bidders start bidding up to their valuation. After a bidder drops out at price p, the two
remaining bidders learn their opponent￿ s value and know they can win the second auction
at price p. So they both drop out immediately of the ￿rst auction (and the prize is assigned
randomly to one of them).
Suppose now that bidders 1 and 2 join a ring and that bidder 3 does not know they
do. Moreover, assume that ring bidders know each other valuations and, without loss of
generality, that v1 > v2. If bidder 1 drops out at price zero in the ￿rst action, this induces
bidder 3 to bid less aggressively, because she expects to win the second auction at price zero
if she loses the ￿rst one. So bidder 3 drops out immediately after bidder 1, and bidder 2 wins
the ￿rst auction at price 0. In the second auction, bidder 2 does not participate and it is a
dominant strategy for bidder 1 and bidder 3 to bid up to their valuations (even if bidder 3 is
35Of course, in both cases bidder 3 is worse o⁄ than in an auction without a ring, since in this last case
bidder 3 makes the two inferences described (after a bidder drops out) and the remaining active bidder bids
less aggressively than he does when he is part of a ring.
17then ￿surprised￿to see bidder 1 bidding more than zero).36
Therefore, the collusive strategy induces a competitor who is not aware of the presence of
the ring to bid less aggressively in the ￿rst auction, as in a single-object auction with a¢ liated
values, and this increases the probability that the ring wins the ￿rst auctions and reduces
the price it pays. In our simple example, the ring always wins the ￿rst auction at price
0. Moreover, the ring also wins the second auction with a strictly higher probability than
without collusion, since bidder 1, rather than bidder 2, competes with bidder 3 in the second
auction. Indeed, for the ring to win both auctions it is su¢ cient that one of its members has
a higher valuation than bidder 3.
In contrast to an auction with a¢ liated values, in sequential auctions a ring bidder who
drops out at a low price sends a misleading signal about the intensity of competition in
later auctions, rather than about the prize value.37 As in our main model, collusion reduces
e¢ ciency and the seller￿ s revenue. Finally, our analysis suggests that prices should increase
in sequential auctions, when some (but not all) bidders collude.
7. Conclusions
Collusive behavior in auctions is arguably the main concern of auction designers and sell-
ers. We have described how colluding bidders may strategically use bids to mislead their
competitors (and the auctioneer) into believing that their valuation of the prize is very low.
Collusion hurts outsiders and reduces the e¢ ciency of an English auction.
During recent European 3G auctions, some bidders managed to convince governments
and competitors that the licenses on sale were not pro￿table by bidding extremely low prices
or by failing to participate altogether. Perhaps ￿rms were trying to reduce competition in
future auctions, improve their bargaining power with sellers, or induce more favorable trading
conditions with suppliers or a more benevolent attitude from regulators. Many telecom ￿rms
have then tried to induce governments to relax rules that prevent them from owning two
licenses or from sharing a 3G network.
But when bidders drop out of an auction at a very low price, they may not necessarily do
it because they believe the prize is not worth it.
36Of course, a similar collusive strategy can be used even if the objects on sale are not identical, and their
values are either positively or negatively correlated.
37Sequential (private-value) auctions have a common-value element given by the value of losing the ￿rst
auction and winning the second one. In sequential auctions, as in our main model, a ring bidder who drops
out of the ￿rst auction signals to his opponent that the value of losing the ￿rst auction is high.
18A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We need to prove that the truthful revelation of their signals is
an equilibrium for ring bidders. Notice that the side-payment received by a ring bidder from
the ring center does not depend on the signal he reports and, hence, cannot a⁄ect incentives.
Therefore, a ring bidder￿ s report depends only on his expected payment to the ring center
and his expected pro￿t if he is chosen as the designated bidder.
In mechanism M, ring bidders actually participate in a second-price sealed-bid knockout
auction whose prize is the right to be chosen as the designated bidder and to retain the
auction prize if it is won by the ring. So the value of winning the knockout for a ring bidder
is the expected collusive pro￿t if he is the designated bidder, given all signals reported by ring
bidders (which a⁄ect his valuation). This expected pro￿t is increasing in a bidder￿ s signal
since, other things being equal, a bidder with a higher signal has a higher valuation, and hence
he expects to obtain a higher collusive pro￿t. And if he wins the knockout, a bidder pays the
expected collusive pro￿t if he had a signal equal to the second-highest reported signal, which
does not depend on his report. This payment is lower than his expected collusive pro￿t as the
designated bidder if and only if his actual signal is higher than the second-highest reported
signal. Therefore, if other ring bidders report their true signals, a bidder is pleased to win
the knockout if and only if he has the highest signal among all ring bidders. This implies
that it is an equilibrium for each ring bidder to report his signal truthfully.
In Section 5 we are going to prove that it is an equilibrium for the designated bidder to
bid in the auction according to the strategy ￿ ￿ i.e., up to his expected valuation conditional
on winning, given the ring information and the information he infers from the behavior of
non-ring bidders. Other ring bidders drop out of the auction at price zero and cannot gain
by deviating because they cannot win at a price lower than the expected valuation of the
designated bidder, which is higher than their valuation (since the designated bidder has the
highest signal).
It follows that mechanism M is incentive-compatible. The fact that M is (ex-ante) budget-
balanced in expectation follows from the de￿nitions of the side-payments made and received
by the ring center. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Since non-ring bidders are unaware of the presence of a ring, their
bidding strategy is de￿ned by Proposition 1. Therefore, after the m￿1 ring bidders with the
lowest signals drop out at price zero and k non-ring bidders drop out at prices pm ￿ ::: ￿
pk+m￿1, a non-ring bidder with signal xi bids up to:







Xi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Yk+m = xi;
Yk+m￿1 = zk;:::;Ym ￿ x;:::;Y1 ￿ x
￿
:
This is lower than the price at which she drops out when there is no collusion, that is if m￿1
ring bidders do not all necessarily drop out at price zero.
After k non-ring bidder dropped out, if the last n ￿ m ￿ k non-ring bidders all drop out








19because each of the n ￿ m ￿ k non-ring bidder has signal  ￿1
k (p). Therefore, after winning









By the de￿nition of ￿k in (4.1), the designated bidder stays in the auction as long as the above
inequality holds. Hence, the strategy ￿ is a best reply to the strategies  k (:) of non-ring
bidders.
By Proposition 1, after m + k ￿ 1 bidders dropped out, without collusion the designated
bidder bids up to:
pm+k = E[Vm jXi = Yn￿1 = ::: = Ym+k = wm; ym+k￿1;:::;y1]: (A1)
With collusion, the designated bidder￿ s expected valuation when the price is pm+k (after k









Notice that, since wm is the highest signal among ring bidders, even without collusion the m￿1
bidders with signals w1;:::;wm￿1 drop out of the auction before the designated bidder. It
follows that the expectations in (A1) and (A2) are conditioned on the same signals. Moreover,
 ￿1
k (pm+k) ￿ wm since, after observing m￿1 bidders quit at price 0, a non-ring bidder must
have a signal at least as high as wm to be willing to remain active up to the same price at
which the designated bidder with signal wm is willing to remain active. Therefore, (A2) is
greater than (A1): with collusion, at price pm+k the valuation of the designated bidder is
greater than pm+k and, hence, he does not drop out of the auction. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. The probability that a buyer with signal wm wins an auction with n
potential buyers and no collusion is:
Pr[wm > yn￿1] = Pr
￿
￿i




The probability that the designated bidder wins the auction when the ring adopts mechanism
M (i.e., the probability that he bids higher than the n ￿ m non-ring bidders) is:
Pr
￿
￿n￿m￿1 >  n￿m￿1 (zn￿m)
￿
:
The latter probability is greater than the former because:
(i)  n￿m￿1 (zn￿m) < ￿i
n￿2 (yn￿1;y1;:::;yn￿2) by Lemma 1 and the fact that zn￿m ￿ yn￿1;
(ii) ￿n￿m￿1 > ￿i
n￿2 (wm;y1;:::;yn￿2) by Lemma 1.
The second part of the statement follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that m ￿ 1 ring
bidders drop out at price zero. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a generic equilibrium in linear and increasing bidding func-
tions. Let the price at which the designated ring bidder drops out of the auction in equilibrium
be:
h(x1;x2) = a + b(x1 + x2);
20where a and b are two constants. To determine the values of a and b, we use the fact that
equilibrium bidding functions must be reciprocal best replies.
If bidder 3 wins the auction at price p, then she expects the sum of the two ring bidders￿
signals (x1 + x2) to be equal to h￿1 (p) =
p￿a
b . In equilibrium bidder 3 bids up to the expected
value of the prize conditional on winning. Therefore, she bids up to price p3 such that:










It then follows that, if the designated ring bidder wins at price p, he expects bidder 3￿ s signal






. And in equilibrium the designated bidder bids up to the
expected value of the prize conditional on winning. So he bids up to price p1 such that:
















In order for the function h(:) to be an equilibrium bidding function, it must consistent









The unique meaningful solution to these two equations is b = 2 + " and a = 0 (the other
solution being b = 0).
An identical argument holds for the bidding function of bidder 3. Finally, notice that the
other ring bidder can do no better than abstain form the auction, since bidder 3 would not
make any inference from his bidding behavior. ￿
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